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Abstract. Most allocation rules for network games presented in the literature assume that the
network structure is fixed. We put explicit emphasis on the construction of networks and examine
the dynamic formation of networks whose evolution across time periods is stochastic. Time-series
of networks are studied that describe processes of network formation where links may appear or
disappear at any period. Moreover, convergence to an efficient network is not necessarily prescribed.
Transitions from one network to another are random and yield a Markov chain. We propose the
link-based allocation rule for such dynamic random network formation processes and provide its
axiomatic characterization. By considering a monotone game and a particular (natural) network
formation process we recover the link-based flexible network allocation rule of Jackson (2005a).
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1 Introduction
1.1 Aim of the paper
Interactions can be naturally modeled by networks, and consequently, successfully studied
with the support of network theory. Interacting individuals can be viewed as players that
are linked in a network and contribute to a total productive value or utility of the network.
One of the key questions in a cooperative setting is how to divide the value generated by
the network between the players. It means defining an allocation rule that will specify for
each member his share of the value of the network. Different proposals concerning this
topic, and both cooperative and non-cooperative foundations of network allocation rules,
have been presented in the literature. For surveys of the vast literature on the issues we
refer, e.g., to Slikker and van den Nouweland (2001), Dutta and Jackson (2003), van den
Nouweland (2005), Jackson (2005b, 2008). Also some of the more recent works that will
be mentioned in this section provide (short) surveys of different allocation rules.
⋆ This research project is supported by the National Agency for Research (Agence Nationale de la Recherche).
The authors thank participants of the Summer Workshop in Economic Theory (SWET13) in Paris, in partic-
ular, Bernard Cornet, Anne van den Nouweland and Myrna Wooders for helpful comments.
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One of the crucial features of real-life social and economic interactions is the fact that
they are usually not static. Although dynamic networks, i.e., networks that evolve over
time, can be particularly useful for modeling such interactions, insufficient attention is still
paid to network dynamics. In particular, studying allocation rules usually avoids dynamic
aspects of network formation. In the present work, we aim at studying how to distribute
between players the value generated by dynamic networks. The main contribution of
the paper is to introduce and characterize axiomatically an allocation rule for dynamic
random network formation processes.
Before describing more in detail our dynamic framework and the allocation rule, first
we present a very brief overview of the related literature.
1.2 Related literature
In the seminal work by Myerson (1977) a cooperative game with transferable utilities
has been supplemented by a network structure which can be seen as the communication
lines between players. In the literature that followed his work the terms communication
structures and communication games are usually used. Myerson (1977) introduced and
characterized an allocation rule, an extension of the Shapley value (Shapley (1953)) to
communication games, which is now called the Myerson value (see also, e.g., Myerson
(1980), Aumann and Myerson (1988)). Meessen (1988) proposed an alternative rule for
communication situations, called the position value, which has been then characterized
by Borm et al. (1992) on the class of communication situations in which the graph is
cycle-free. Slikker (2005a,b) provided two characterizations of this value without such
restrictions on the graph. Hamiache (1999) presented another rule for communication
situations; see also Bilbao et al. (2006). Allocation rules for hypergraph communication
situations were studied by van den Nouweland et al. (1992). While Dutta et al. (1998)
considered a class of external allocation rules that contains the Myerson value where
forming communication links is costless, Slikker and van den Nouweland (2000b) used
a natural extension of the Myerson value to determine the payoffs to the players in
communication situations with costs for establishing links.
Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) introduced a class of games (called network games)
where the value generated depends directly on the network structure, and showed that
the Myerson value has a direct extension from communication games to network games.
They defined the egalitarian allocation rule and the component-wise egalitarian allocation
rule. In this framework, benefits and costs of forming links are assumed and the focus is
on pairwise stable and efficient networks. For the potential conflict between stability and
efficiency of networks, see, e.g., Dutta and Mutuswami (1997) and Dutta and Jackson
(2000). Jackson and van den Nouweland (2005) considered the strongly stable networks,
i.e., networks that are stable against changes in links by any coalition of players. Caulier
et al. (2013) showed how efficiency and stability can be reconciled in a setting where play-
ers are organized in a network and a coalitional structure. They developed the notion of
contractually stable networks where the consent of coalitional partners is needed in order
to modify the structure. Slikker (2007) characterized axiomatically the Myerson value,
the position value and the component-wise egalitarian solution, and also proposed three
non-cooperative bargaining procedures that result in the same payoffs as the three rules.
For other works concerning non-cooperative foundations of allocation rules, we should
mention, e.g., Pe´rez-Castrillo and Wettstein (2001) who presented an implementation of
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the Shapley value, and Pe´rez-Castrillo and Wettstein (2005) who described a mechanism
that ends in the Myerson value of the monotonic cover of the value function.
Caulier (2010) considered a rule that provides payoffs to links, where these payoffs
are then divided equally over players. He followed Shapley’s characterization for this al-
location procedure to the links. The weighted Shapley values defined by Kalai and Samet
(1987) was generalized to communication situations in Haeringer (1999) and to hierar-
chical structures in Slikker and van den Nouweland (2000a). van den Nouweland and
Slikker (2012) characterized the position value for network situations where no condition
on the underlying network is required. Ghintran (2013) generalized the position value by
taking into account the negotiation powers of players on the allocation of the worth. She
characterized this new weighted position value for communication situations with cycle-
free networks. For a similar approach, see also, e.g., Haeringer (2006) who considered
allocation rules for cooperative games with transferable utilities. Ghintran et al. (2012)
generalized the position value defined for the class of deterministic communication situ-
ations, to the class of generalized probabilistic communication situations, and provided
two characterizations of this allocation rule.
Although there exists the vast literature on modeling interactions by social and eco-
nomic networks, the issue of network dynamics has still not received enough attention.
Some examples of the dynamic approach to interactions are presented, e.g., in some ex-
tensions of the Jackson-Wolinsky connections model to a dynamic framework; see e.g.,
Jackson and Watts (2002), Watts (2001, 2002). Konishi and Ray (2003) considered a
dynamic model of coalition formation when players are farsighted. A model of dynamic
network formation with farsighted players was studied by Dutta et al. (2005). They de-
fined a concept of equilibrium which takes into account farsighted behavior of players and
allows for limited cooperation amongst them. Page et al. (2005) introduced a dynamic
framework of network formation and analyzed farsightedly consistent directed networks.
They studied the notion of a supernetwork which is a collection of directed networks and
represents coalitional preferences and rules governing network formation. Page and Wood-
ers (2009) introduced a model of network formation with a set of feasible networks, player
preferences, rules of network formation and a dominance relation on feasible networks.
The authors characterized sets of network outcomes that are likely to emerge and persist.
Also Herings et al. (2009) addressed the question which networks one might expect to
emerge in the long run when players are farsighted. They provided a full characterization
of unique pairwise farsightedly stable sets of networks. Page and Wooders (2007) modeled
club structures as bipartite networks and formulated the problem of club formation as a
game of network formation. They identified club networks that are stable if players are
farsighted, and club networks that are stable if players are myopic. Page and Wooders
(2010) formulated club formation with multiple memberships as a noncooperative game
of network formation and identified conditions sufficient to guarantee that the game has
a potential function.
Despite the growing literature on dynamic networks, most allocation rules for network
games assume that the network structure is fixed. The key question is therefore how to
distribute between players the value generated by a dynamic network. Jackson (2005a)
introduced a new class of allocation rules that take into account the potential alterna-
tive constructions of the network, by assuming that the efficient network will eventually
emerge. He considered the so called player-based flexible network allocation rule and the
3
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link-based flexible network allocation rule. However, in the approach used in Jackson
(2005a), even if the allocation is being decided upon when the network is formed or can
still be changed, the framework is still static, since the dynamics is just introduced in the
fictive construction/decomposition of the structure.
1.3 Summary of the paper
In this paper, we put explicit emphasis on the construction of networks and examine
the dynamic formation of networks whose evolution across time periods is stochastic.
For a similar approach but used for coalition processes, see Faigle and Grabisch (2012,
2013). We study time-series of networks that describe processes of network formation
where several players or links may appear or disappear at any period. Convergence to
one of the efficient networks does not necessarily need to be prescribed. One of the basic
notions in our framework is the notion of a scenario of network formation processes
which is simply a sequence of networks that are observed at subsequent time periods. We
restrict our analysis to finite scenarios. A two-network sequence in a scenario is called
a transition and is elementary if the two networks differ from each other only by one
link. Transitions from one network to another are random and yield a Markov chain. A
scenario allocation rule assigns to every value function a vector of allocations for every
player and every scenario. In order to specify how the value generated by a dynamic
process is distributed among players, an allocation rule for dynamic network processes is
defined as an expected value over all possible scenarios of the scenario allocation rules.
In the paper, we are interested in the perspective of assigning values to links rather
than players, and consequently, our allocation rule is related to the link-based flexible
network allocation rule by Jackson (2005a). We introduce the link-based allocation rule
for dynamic random network formation processes, denoted as the LBD allocation rule.
We focus on transitions, i.e., the LBD scenario allocation rule is equal to the sum of
the transition allocation rules over the transitions that form the given scenario. The
symmetric difference of two networks is the set of links where these networks differ. A
player is inactive in a transition if he is not adjacent to the symmetric difference of
the networks forming the transition. Otherwise, the player is active. For any elementary
transition, the difference between the values generated by its new and old networks is
divided equally between the two active players. Every inactive player gets zero. If the
transition is not elementary, then we take the average over all possible shortest paths
formed by elementary transitions of the given transition. We show that for a monotone
game, the link-based flexible network allocation rule of Jackson (2005a) coincides with
our allocation rule associated to the so called natural network formation process. In such
a process, all scenarios are equally probable, we start with the empty network and add
one link at each step until we get the complete network.
We provide an axiomatic characterization of the LBD scenario allocation rule which
is based on a set of eight very natural axioms: concatenation, efficiency, inactive player,
linearity for transitions, null link axiom, equal division, symmetry and antisymmetry for
entering/leaving links. The concatenation axiom says that a scenario allocation rule of
the concatenation of two concatenable scenarios (i.e., two sequences such that the last
network of the one scenario is equal to the first network of the other scenario) is equal to
the sum of scenario allocation rules of the two concatenable scenarios. Efficiency means
that for any finite scenario, the sum of the scenario allocations for all players is equal to
4
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the difference between the values generated by the last and the first network that form
the given scenario. Our two next axioms say that an inactive player in a transition gets
always zero, and that the transition allocation rule is a linear operator for any transition.
A link is null for a value function if adding that link to any network not containing that
link does not change the value. According to the null link axiom, if in a transition all links
in the symmetric difference to which a player is adjacent are null, then this player gets
zero. According to the equal division axiom, in a transition where only one link which
appears (resp., disappears) is nonnull and is not adjacent to any nonnull disappearing
(resp., appearing) link, the two players forming that link get the same allocation. The
symmetry axiom concerns only players in the same situation: either they have some new
links (i.e., they are adjacent to some entering links) or they lose some links (they are
adjacent to some leaving links). Players having both entering and leaving links are not
concerned. Also, null links count for nothing. Suppose then that all entering nonnull
links are symmetric (i.e., they have the same marginal contribution). Then the symmetry
axiom says that each player receives an amount proportional to the number of links he is
adjacent. Two distinct links are antisymmetric for a value function if adding them both
to any graph not containing these links does not change the value. The antisymmetry for
entering/leaving links says that if all pairs of entering links are symmetric (similarly for
all pairs of leaving links), and if there exists an entering link and a leaving link which are
antisymmetric, then every player gets an amount proportional to the number of links he
is adjacent.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we recapitulate basic concepts on
networks that will be used in the paper. In Section 3 our framework and the link-based
allocation rule for dynamic network processes are introduced. In 4 we establish the ax-
iomatic characterization for this new allocation rule. Section 5 presents some concluding
remarks and Section 6 contains proofs of the main results.
2 Preliminaries on networks and allocation rules
In this section we recall some preliminaries and standard notations concerning networks
and allocation rules. Some notations related exclusively to our dynamic model will be
introduced in the next section.
Consider a finite set of players N = {1, . . . , n} connected in some network relationship.
A network is a set of pairs ij of players1 with i, j ∈ N , i 6= j,2 where ij ∈ N indicates the
presence of a link between players i and j. Networks under consideration are undirected.
Two particular network relationships among players in N are easily identified: the
empty network g∅ without any link between players, and the complete network gN which
is the set of all possible subsets of N of size 2. Let G be the set of all possible network
relationships among players in N , i.e., G = {g|g ⊆ gN}.3 We use the following standard
set operations
g ∪ g′ = {ij | ij ∈ g or ij ∈ g′}
g ∩ g′ = {ij | ij ∈ g and ij ∈ g′}
1 For convenience we use the shorthand notation ij for the pair {i, j}.
2 Loop ii is not a possibility in this setting.
3 Since N is fixed, in order to simplify the notation, we will use G instead of G(N).
5
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g \ g′ = {ij | ij ∈ g and ij /∈ g′}
By g + ij we denote the network obtained by adding link ij to an existing network g.
Similarly, g − ij is the network obtained by deleting link ij from an existing network g.
For two networks g and g′, g∆g′ denotes the symmetric difference, which is the set of
links where g and g′ differ, i.e.,
g∆g′ = (g ∪ g′) \ (g ∩ g′)
Let Li(g) denote the set of links that player i is involved in, and let ℓ(g) be the total
number of links in g, i.e.,
Li(g) = {ij | j ∈ N and ij ∈ g}, ℓi(g) = |Li(g)|, ℓ(g) =
1
2
∑
i
ℓi(g)
A value function on networks is a mapping v : G → R, assigning a real number
to any network. This could be for example the benefit or some worth generated by the
network. For simplicity, we denote v({ij}) and v({ij, . . . , kl}) by v(ij) and v(ij, . . . , kl),
respectively. Usually, a pair (N, v) consisting of a player set N and a value function v ∈ V
is called a network game. We denote by V (N) the set of all possible value functions on
N , or more simply V if N is understood.
A value function v is monotonic if v(g′) ≤ v(g) if g′ ⊆ g. Adding links to a network is
not detrimental to the value.
Given a value function v ∈ V , the monotonic cover of v is the value function vˆ such
that vˆ(g) = maxg′⊆g v(g
′). The idea is that the players in a given network g may use the
available links in any way they want in order to maximize the value generated. Note that
v is monotonic if and only if v = vˆ.
An important example of (monotonic) value functions are unanimity games. For any
network g ∈ G, its associated unanimity game ug is defined by
ug(g
′) =
{
1, if g′ ⊇ g
0, otherwise
As for TU-games, unanimity games form a basis of the set of network games for a fixed
N (simply because the set of links plays exactly the roˆle of N).
A network g is efficient relative to v if it maximizes v, i.e., v(g) ≥ v(g′) for all g′ ∈ G.
An allocation rule for a network game (N, v) specifies how the value generated by
any network g is allocated among players. Specifically, an allocation rule is a function
Y : G× V → Rn such that
∑
i Yi(g, v) = v(g) for all v and g.
Jackson (2005a) proposes, in particular, the player-based flexible network allocation
rule and the link-based flexible network allocation rule. Consider any v ∈ V and a network
g ∈ G. The link-based flexible network allocation rule is defined by
Y LBFNi (g, v) =
v(g)
vˆ(gN)
∑
j 6=i

 ∑
g′⊆gN−ij
1
2
(vˆ(g′ + ij)− vˆ(g′))
(
ℓ(g′)!(ℓ(gN)− ℓ(g′)− 1)!
ℓ(gN)!
)
(1)
6
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Note that if g is efficient, then v(g) = vˆ(g) = vˆ(gN). Hence the normalization factor v(g)
vˆ(gN )
disappears.
Let us make some comments about this rule, which will motivate the construction
of our new rule. As far as we know, the LBFN rule is one of the few examples of an
allocation rule trying to take into account some dynamics of the network formation. It is
called “flexible” because it is considered that the network g under consideration, which
is not necessarily efficient, should evolve towards some efficient network. However, note
that the way this evolution is realized is ignored by the rule, as well as the true final
efficient network, which is not necessarily gN . Also, remark that g itself appears in the
formula only as a normalization factor, but not directly in the computation. Lastly, we
observe that it is vˆ instead of v which is used in the formula. However, infinitely many
games have the same monotonic cover, hence the information conveyed by v is partially
ignored in the computation.
Based on these observations, we would like to propose an allocation rule which assumes
that the network is not fixed and does not suppose that eventually the complete network
or an efficient network will form. Rather, we consider that the evolution is free. Second,
this rule should take fully into account the information contained in v, as well as the
evolution of the network from the beginning to the end. As a conclusion, instead of
Y (g, v) or Y (gN , vˆ) we should have Y (G, v) where G is a “scenario” of network evolution,
or better Y (U, v), where U is a Markov chain or some stochastic process ruling the
evolution of the network. This motivates the construction we propose in the following
sections.
3 Markovian network processes
3.1 Description of the dynamic network process
We model a stochastic dynamic process of network formation, where at each discrete
period of time a network is identified with some probability. One may think of a random
meeting process where players randomly bump into each other in a pairwise fashion at
each discrete period of time. In this setting, we view the formation of networks as a
process that evolves over discrete time. A scenario of network formation process is a
sequence of networks
G = g0, g1, g2, g3 . . .
with gt ∈ G for t = 0, 1, 2, . . . with the meaning that gt is the network observed at time
period t. Note that a given network may appear several times in a sequence. A special
case of scenario, called a normal scenario, is the one in which g0 = g
∅. A scenario is finite
if the process eventually stops after a finite number of periods or converges to a given
network, i.e., if there is T ∈ N such that gt = gT for each t ≥ T . In this paper, we focus
on finite scenarios, and by S we denote the set of all finite scenarios. For a discussion
of a possibility to consider infinite scenarios in Markovian coalition processes, see Faigle
and Grabisch (2012).
Any two-element subsequence g, g′ in G is called a transition and will be denoted by
g → g′. A transition g → g′ is elementary if g′ differs from g only by one link.
7
 
Documents de Travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2013.63
Example 1 Consider a small group consisting of 3 researchers in a lab: Agnieszka (A),
Jean-Franc¸ois (J) and Michel (M), i.e., we have N = {A, J,M}. The lab wants to promote
collaboration among its members by announcing regular calls for 2-person projects. A
link between any two researchers means submitting a project by these two researchers
for getting a grant. An example of a normal finite scenario is
G = g∅, {AM}, {AJ, JM}, gN , {AM}, {AJ,AM}
where each network appearing in this scenario corresponds to the set of the projects
submitted for a given call. Consequently, in the scenario G, first Agnieszka and Michel
decide to submit a project, but they do not resubmit anything for the next call, where
two other projects are submitted: one by Agnieszka and Jean-Franc¸ois, and another one
by Jean-Franc¸ois and Michel. Then, at the next call, every pair submits a project. Next,
only Agnieszka and Michel submit a project, and finally for the last call, Agnieszka and
Jean-Franc¸ois as well as Agnieszka and Michel submit two projects.
In the scenario G, three transitions are elementary, i.e.,
g∅ → {AM}, {AJ, JM} → gN , {AM} → {AJ,AM}
and the remaining two transitions are not elementary, i.e.,
{AM} → {AJ, JM}, gN → {AM}
A value function v can be defined, where v(g) depends on the CV’s of the researchers
involved and the quality of their cooperation. An allocation rule considering v and G would
define a reward to individual researchers, for their involvement in enhancing cooperation
in the lab over a certain period. We can assume that v(g∅) = 0.
We assume that the probability of transition from one network to another depends
only on the current period, and not on the whole history of transitions. Consequently,
a scenario is ruled by a Markov chain with G as the set of states. If the scenario has
attained a network g at period t, then the probability to observe a network g′ in period
t + 1, i.e., the probability of transition g → g′ is given by utgg′. We consider stationary
Markov processes whose transition probabilities utgg′ are independent on t and denote
them simply by ugg′. The transition matrix is therefore given by
U := [ugg′]g,g′∈G
The matrix U is row-stochastic, i.e., ugg′ ≥ 0 and
∑
g′∈G ugg′ = 1 for each g ∈ G.
If G = g0, g1, g2 . . . gT is a finite normal scenario with the transition matrix U, then
the probability Pr(G) of occurrence of scenario G is given by
Pr(G) = Pr(g0)
T∏
t=1
ugt−1gt (2)
where Pr(g0) is the probability of occurrence of the initial state g0.
With a given transition matrix U we associate its directed transition graph Γ whose
vertices are elements g ∈ G, and there is a directed edge from g to g′ in Γ if and only if
ugg′ > 0 in U.
8
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3.2 The link-based allocation rule for dynamic network processes
Next, we will introduce our allocation rule for the dynamic network process described
above. First, we start with general definitions.
Definition 1 Let V be the set of value functions and S be the set of scenarios. A scenario
allocation rule is a mapping ψ : V → Rn×|S|, with components of ψ(v) denoted by ψGi for
player i and scenario G.
Definition 2 An allocation rule for dynamic network processes is a mapping Ψ : V → Rn
defined as the expected value over all possible scenarios of the scenario allocation rules,
i.e.,
Ψ (v) :=
∑
G∈S
Pr(G)ψG(v)
where Pr(G) is the probability of occurrence of scenario G.
We introduce and characterize the so-called link-based allocation rule for dynamic
network processes, denoted by Φ and abbreviated by the LBD (allocation) rule (LBD =
link-based dynamic). Accordingly, φG denotes the LBD scenario allocation rule.
We focus on transitions and study the properties of the following allocation rule:
– If the transition g → g′ is elementary (i.e., g′ differs from g only by one link, say ij),
then
φg→g
′
i = φ
g→g′
j =
1
2
(v(g′)− v(g))
and for all other players φg→g
′
k = 0.
– If the transition is not elementary, we take the average over all possible shortest paths
formed of elementary transitions from g to g′.
We introduce some additional concepts and notations.
Definition 3 A player i is adjacent to graph g if he is adjacent to some link in g, i.e.,
there exists j ∈ N such that ij ∈ g. We denote it by i ⇀ g or g ↼ i. Similarly, a link ij
is adjacent to a graph g if either i ⇀ g or j ⇀ g. We denote it by ij ⇀ g or g ↼ ij.
In order to obtain compact formulations, we introduce the signed version of links and
set of links. Considering a transition g → g′, entering links λ ∈ g′ \ g have a positive
sign, while leaving links have a negative sign. The signed version of a link λ is denoted
by ελ, with ε = − or + depending whether λ is leaving or entering. Similarly, if h is a set
of links (graph), εh is the set of signed links4. As a consequence, writing g + εij means
g + ij if ε = + (entering) and g − ij if ε = − (leaving). Similarly, g + εh stands for the
less readable (g∪h+)\h− with h+ (resp. h−) the set of entering (resp. leaving) links in h.
Note that the “+” operation acts like the usual addition, e.g., g+ ij− ij = g, except that
it is idempotent: g+ ij+ ij = g+ ij, g− ij − ij = g− ij. Also, note that g− εij = g+ ij
if ε = −.
In summary, entering and leaving links form the set g∆g′, which could be called the
set of active links in transition g → g′. Accordingly, one can define active players.
4 We are conscious that the notation is ambiguous, but it should cause no problem since sets of links are denoted
by g, g′, h, h′, etc.
9
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Definition 4 A player i is said to be active in a transition g → g′ if he is adjacent to
g∆g′ (in symbols: i ⇀ g∆g′), otherwise i is said to be inactive in the transition g → g′.
Under these conventions we can introduce the following definition:
Definition 5 The link-based allocation rule for dynamic network processes (the LBD
allocation rule) Φ is defined as
Φ(v) :=
∑
G∈S
Pr(G)φG(v) (3)
and φG is the LBD scenario allocation rule given by
φG(v) =
T−1∑
k=0
φgk→gk+1(v) (4)
with G = g0, g1, g2 . . . gT and
φg→g
′
i (v) =
{
1
2|g∆g′|!
∑
σ
∑
ik∈g∆g′(v(g + εh
ik
σ )− v(g + εh
ik
σ − εik)), if i ⇀ g∆g
′
0, otherwise
(5)
where σ is any permutation on the set of links g∆g′ = {λ1, . . . , λ|g∆g′|}, and h
ik
σ is the
first set in the sequence {λσ(1)}, {λσ(1), λσ(2)}, . . . , g∆g
′ containing ik.
Note that inactive players receive 0.
Remark 1 It is important to note that the two levels (the allocation rule level and the
scenario allocation rule level) work independently. That is, on the allocation rule level,
the transitions between networks obey a Markov chain, which determines the probability
of transitions of a network g into another network g′. This stochastic process typically
results of the noncooperative behavior of the players, trying to maximize their own utility
function. In a sense, it comes from the players taken as individuals. By contrast, on the
scenario rule level, for a given transition g → g′, one has to define in a proper way how
the benefit/loss of the transition (i.e., v(g′)− v(g)) is shared among the players who are
active in the transition. This could be seen as a basic rule imposed by the “network”, i.e.,
by the players considered as a society, and which therefore operates on a different level. If
one imposes symmetry in the sharing (no player has a special advantage, only v and the
structure of the network matter), our axiomatization shows that we are led to compute,
for a nonelementary transition, the (unweighted) average over all possibilities of starting
from g and arriving at g′ by elementary transitions, regardless of the probabilities of those
elementary transitions stemming from the Markov chain.
Example 2 Consider the scenario G given in Example 1. By virtue of (4), we have
φG(v) = φg
∅→{AM}(v)+φ{AM}→{AJ,JM}(v)+φ{AJ,JM}→g
N
(v)+φg
N→{AM}(v)+φ{AM}→{AJ,AM}(v)
The symmetric differences and players adjacent to them are the following:
g∅∆{AM} = {AM}, {AM}∆{AJ, JM} = gN , {AJ, JM}∆gN = {AM}
10
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gN∆{AM} = {AJ, JM}, {AM}∆{AJ,AM} = {AJ}
A,M ⇀ {AM}, A, J,M ⇀ gN
A, J,M ⇀ {AJ, JM}, A, J ⇀ {AJ}
Let us apply (5) to the example. First, for the elementary transitions we have
φ
g∅→{AM}
A (v) = φ
g∅→{AM}
M (v) =
v(AM)
2
, φ
g∅→{AM}
J (v) = 0
φ
{AJ,JM}→gN
A (v) = φ
{AJ,JM}→gN
M (v) =
v(gN)− v(AJ, JM)
2
, φ
{AJ,JM}→gN
J (v) = 0
φ
{AM}→{AJ,AM}
A (v) = φ
{AM}→{AJ,AM}
J (v) =
v(AJ,AM)− v(AM)
2
, φ
{AM}→{AJ,AM}
M (v) = 0
Consider now the (not elementary) transition {AM} → {AJ, JM}. There are six
shortest sequences of elementary transitions between {AM} and {AJ, JM}, as presented
in Figure 1. The red/green/blue arrows in this figure indicate the transitions where
A/J/M is active.
J
J
J
J J
J J
J
A
AA A
AA A
A
M
MM M
MM M
M
Fig. 1. The shortest sequences of elementary transitions between {AM} and {AJ, JM} and their active players
(red/green/blue arrows indicate the transitions where A/J/M is active)
We have then
φ
{AM}→{AJ,JM}
A (v) =
1
12
[v(AJ)−v(AM)−v(AM)+v(AJ, JM)−v(JM)+v(AJ)−v(AM)+
v(AJ,AM)−v(AM)+v(AJ, JM)−v(gN )+v(AJ, JM)−v(AM, JM)+v(AJ, JM)−v(AM, JM)]
=
1
12
[
v(AJ,AM)− v(JM)− v(gN) + 2(v(AJ)− v(AM, JM)) + 4(v(AJ, JM)− v(AM))
]
11
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φ
{AM}→{AJ,JM}
J (v) =
1
12
[v(AJ, JM)+v(AJ, JM)+v(AJ,AM)−v(AM)+v(AJ, JM)−v(AJ)
+v(gN)− v(AM) + v(AM, JM)− v(AM) + v(AJ, JM)− v(JM) + v(gN)− v(AM)] =
=
1
12
[
2v(gN) + 4v(AJ, JM) + v(AJ,AM) + v(AM, JM)− v(JM)− v(AJ)− 4v(AM)
]
φ
{AM}→{AJ,JM}
M (v) =
1
12
[−v(AM) + v(AJ, JM)− v(AJ) + 2(v(JM)− v(AM))+
+2(v(AJ, JM)− v(AJ,AM)) + v(AM, JM)− v(AM) + v(AJ, JM)− v(gN)] =
=
1
12
[
v(AM, JM) + 2(v(JM)− v(AJ,AM)) + 4(v(AJ, JM)− v(AM))− v(gN)− v(AJ)
]
In a similar way we can calculate φ
gN→{AM}
i (v) for i ∈ N . We have then
φ
gN→{AM}
A (v) =
1
4
[
−v(gN) + v(AM, JM)− v(AJ,AM) + v(AM)
]
φ
gN→{AM}
J (v) =
1
2
[
v(AM)− v(gN)
]
φ
gN→{AM}
M (v) =
1
4
[
−v(AM, JM) + v(AM)− v(gN)) + v(AJ,AM)
]
Note that for our scenario G we have φGA+φ
G
J +φ
G
M = v(AJ,AM). In the next section
we will show that the LBD scenario allocation rule is indeed efficient.
A first remarkable result is that we can recover the link-based flexible network alloca-
tion rule of Jackson (2005a) by considering a special process, called the natural process.
Definition 6 The natural process is a process of network formation defined by:
- the process starts with the empty network, i.e., g0 = g
∅
- we add one link at each step until we obtain the complete graph gN
- all scenarios are equally probable, i.e., Pr(G) = 1
η!
for each G ∈ S, where η =
(
n
2
)
.
Proposition 1 Assume v is a monotone game. Then for g = gN , the Y LBFN rule coin-
cides with Φ associated to the natural process.
Proof: When v is monotone, the Y LBFN rule reduces to
Y LBFNi (g
N , v) =
∑
j 6=i
[ ∑
g′⊆gN−ij
1
2
(v(g′ + ij)− v(g′))
(ℓ(g′)!(η!− ℓ(g′)− 1)!
η!
)]
Take player i and count his contribution ∆i in each scenario. Consider scenario G. Since
gN is complete, player i has degree n − 1, and therefore ∆i is non null in exactly n − 1
12
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transitions of the scenario where links ij are added, j = 1, . . . , i − 1, i+ 1, . . . , n. When
the link ij is added, we find
∆i =
1
2
(
v(g′ + ij)− v(g′)
)
where g′ is the last graph without ij in G. For a fixed g′, there are ℓ(g′)! paths from the
empty graph to g′, and (η− ℓ(g′)−1)! paths from g′+ ij to the complete graph gN , hence
the result. 
4 Axiomatization of the LBD scenario allocation rule
Next, we provide an axiomatic characterization of the LBD scenario allocation rule. As
introduced in Definition 1, ψG denotes a scenario allocation rule for scenario G. In Section
1 we have already introduced the meaning of the axioms that characterize the LBD
scenario allocation rule. In this section, we provide the formal descriptions of these axioms.
Definition 7 Two sequences G = g0, . . . , gq,G
′ = g′0, . . . , g
′
r are said to be concatenable
if gq = g
′
0, in which case their concatenation is the sequence
G ⊕ G′ := g0, . . . , gq, g
′
1, . . . , g
′
r.
Concatenation (C): Let G,G′ be two concatenable sequences. Then
ψG⊕G
′
= ψG + ψG
′
.
Axiom (C) allows to restrict our attention to transitions. Indeed,
ψG =
T−1∑
k=0
ψgk→gk+1
holds for every sequence G = g0, g1, . . . , gT .
Efficiency (E): For any finite scenario G = g0, g1, . . . , gT it holds
∑
i∈N ψ
G
i =
v(gT )− v(g0).
Inactive player (IP): If i is inactive in g → g′, then ψg→g
′
i (v) = 0 for any v.
Linearity for transitions (L): v 7→ ψg→g
′
(v) is a linear operator for any transi-
tion g → g′.
Definition 8 A link ij is null for v if v(g + ij) = v(g) for every g 6∋ ij.
Null link axiom (NL): If in a transition g → g′ all links in g∆g′ to which player
i is adjacent are null for v, then ψg→g
′
i (v) = 0.
For any graph g and game v, the graph g∗ is the graph where all links which are null
for v have been deleted. This notation is used in the following axioms.
13
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Equal division (ED): In a transition g → g′ where only one link ij ∈ g \ g′
(resp., ij ∈ g′ \ g) is nonnull and ij 6⇀ (g′ \ g)∗ (resp., ij 6⇀ (g \ g′)∗), there is equal
division of the contribution of the link to i and j: ψg→g
′
i = ψ
g→g′
j .
Definition 9 Two distinct links ij, kl are symmetric for v if for every graph g not con-
taining them, it holds v(g + ij) = v(g + kl).
Symmetry (S): Consider the transition g → g′ and a game v. If all links in (g\g′)∗
(resp., (g′ \ g)∗) are symmetric for v (assuming there are at least two symmetric
links), then for all i ⇀ (g \ g′)∗, i 6⇀ (g′ \ g)∗ (resp., i ⇀ (g′ \ g)∗, i 6⇀ (g \ g′)∗), we
have
ψg→g
′
i (v) ∼ ℓi((g∆g
′)∗),
where ∼ means “proportional”.
Remark 2 The (NL), (ED) and (S) axioms can be combined into a single one. Indeed,
if all null links are discarded, a player satisfying the conditions of the (NL) axiom (i.e.,
all adjacent links in g∆g′ are null) has degree 0 in (g∆g′)∗. Now, if only one link ij is
nonnull in g \ g′ and not adjacent to nonnull links in g′ \ g, the degrees of i and j are
equal to 1, hence they receive the same. One could call it the degree axiom (D) and it
would read:
Degree axiom (D): Consider the transition g → g′, a game v and the graph
(g∆g′)∗. If for all distinct links λ, λ′ ∈ (g \ g′)∗ (resp., (g′ \ g)∗), λ and λ′ are
symmetric, then for all i ⇀ (g \g′)∗, i 6⇀ (g′\g)∗ (resp., i ⇀ (g′\g)∗, i 6⇀ (g \g′)∗),
we have
ψg→g
′
i (v) ∼ ℓi((g∆g
′)∗).
Definition 10 Two distinct links ij, kl are antisymmetric for v if v(g + ij + kl) = v(g)
for every graph g not containing them.
Antisymmetry for entering/leaving links (ASEL): Consider the transition
g → g′, a game v and the graph (g∆g′)∗. If all pairs of distinct links in (g \g′)∗ and
in (g′ \ g)∗ are symmetric for v, and if there exists a pair of links λ ∈ (g \ g′)∗, λ′ ∈
(g′ \ g)∗ which are antisymmetric for v, then for all i ⇀ (g∆g′)∗,
ψg→g
′
i (v) ∼ ℓi((g∆g
′)∗).
Antisymmetric links have a counterbalancing effect, in the sense that they annihilate each
other when entering together a network, which can be interpreted by saying that they
bring the same contribution but of opposite sign. Therefore, if one is leaving and the
other entering, their contribution in the scenario becomes equal and of the same sign.
A characterization of asymmetric links can be obtained directly from the correspond-
ing result for TU-games. We find:
Lemma 1 Distinct links λ, λ′ are antisymmetric for v if and only if
mv(g + λ+ λ′) = −mv(g + λ)−mv(g + λ′), ∀g 6∋ λ, λ′,
where mv is the Mo¨bius transform of v.
14
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Similarly we can prove the following lemma:
Lemma 2 Distinct links λ, λ′ are symmetric for v if and only if they are symmetric for
mv:
mv(g + λ) = mv(g + λ′), ∀g 6∋ λ, λ′.
Proof: λ, λ′ are symmetric for v if v(g + λ) = v(g + λ′) for all g 6∋ λ, λ′, which is
equivalent to
0 =
∑
h⊆g+λ
mv(h)−
∑
h⊆g+λ′
mv(h) =
∑
h⊆g
(mv(h + λ)−mv(h+ λ′)), ∀g 6∋ λ, λ′.
For g = g∅ this gives mv(λ) = mv(λ′). For g = {λ′′} we obtain mv(λ′′+λ) = mv(λ′′+λ′).
Continuing the process we find the desired result. 
Corollary 1 Suppose λ, λ′ are antisymmetric for v, and that λ, λ′′ are symmetric for v.
Then λ′, λ′′ are antisymmetric for v.
This shows that in the situation described by axiom (ASEL), any entering link is
antisymmetric with any leaving link.
Proposition 2 The LBD scenario allocation rule satisfies (C), (E), (IP), (L), (NL),
(ED), (S) and (ASEL).
For the proof, see the Appendix.
Theorem 1 The LBD scenario allocation rule is the unique allocation rule satisfying
(C), (L), (IP), (E), (S), (NL), (ASEL) and (ED).
For the proof, we use the following lemma.
Lemma 3 Consider the unanimity game uh, h 6= ∅. Then the following holds:
(i) A link ij is nonnull for uh if and only if ij ∈ h;
(ii) A pair of links ij, kl is symmetric for uh if and only if both ij, kl ∈ h or both ij, kl 6∈ h.
Proof: (i) Take ij ∈ h. Then ij is nonnull since uh(h) 6= uh(h − ij). Conversely, take
ij 6∈ h. Then uh(g) = uh(g − ij) for every g.
(ii) Assume |h| ≥ 2 and consider ij, kl ∈ h two distinct links. Then for any g not
containing them, uh(g + ij) = uh(g + kl) = 0. Now assume |g
N \ h| ≥ 2 and consider
ij, kl 6∈ h two distinct links. Then for any g not containing them, uh(g+ij) = uh(g+kl) =
uh(g). Conversely, for h 6= g
N , take ij ∈ h and kl 6∈ h. Then 1 = uh(h − ij + ij) 6=
uh(h− ij + kl) = 0, hence these links are not symmetric. 
For the proof of Theorem 1, see the Appendix.
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5 Concluding remarks
We have considered the dynamic random network formation processes, where links may
appear and disappear at any time, and a scenario of the process, i.e., a sequence of
networks, forms a Markov chain. We have established the characterization of the scenario
allocation rule for dynamic network processes based on the set of natural axioms. We
have shown that if a monotone game is considered, then the link-based flexible network
allocation rule of Jackson (2005a) coincides with our LBD link-based allocation rule
associated to the natural process.
Our framework of dynamic network formation can naturally model situations with the
set of active players changing over time, where individuals appear or disappear during
the process: some players may become involved in later periods of the network formation
process, some others can be ‘active’ all the time, some individuals may appear only for a
short period of time and disappear forever, or appear again after some time of “silence”,
etc. When allocating value generated by the dynamic networks we take into account
all players that were ever involved in the dynamic network formation process. Hence,
many real-life dynamic interactions with appearing/disappearing actors can naturally be
modeled by our framework.
There are several directions for follow-up research on this subject. While we have
presented the LBD allocation rule which is ‘fair’ in the sense that it is symmetric, we
could consider a weighted version of the rule by introducing additionally weights to players
when allocating the value among them. For instance, in our Example 1, a rule to reward
researchers’ involvement in enhancing cooperation could violate symmetry, by taking
into account the individuals’ frequency of professional missions or their needs for more
sophisticated research equipments. Another extension of the present work could include
a strategic version of the framework and an endogenous model of a stochastic network
formation process.
6 Appendix - Proofs
Proof of Proposition 2
(C) is immediate from (4). (IP), (L) and (NL) are immediate from (5).
(E): By concatenation, it suffices to prove the result for transitions. Consider an
elementary transition g → g′, with link ij added or deleted. Then
∑
k∈N
φg→g
′
k (v) = φ
g→g′
i (v) + φ
g→g′
j (v) = 2×
1
2
(v(g′)− v(g)).
Now, suppose that the transition is not elementary, with η created/deleted links. Along
each of the η! paths from g to g′, efficiency holds, therefore
∑
k∈N
φg→g
′
k =
1
η!
η! (v(g′)− v(g)) = v(g′)− v(g).
(S): Let us consider that either |g \ g′| ≥ 2 or |g′ \ g| ≥ 2.
16
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1. We begin by showing that all null links can be discarded without change: φg→g
′
(v) =
φg→g
′\ij(v) if ij ∈ g′ \ g is null for v (a similar reasoning holds for ij ∈ g \ g′). Take such
a link ij. We have by (5)
φg→g
′
i (v) =
1
2|g∆g′|!
∑
σ
(
v(g + εhijσ )− v(g + h
ij
σ − εij)
)
+
∑
ik∈g∆g′,k 6=j
1
2|g∆g′|!
∑
σ
(
v(g + εhikσ )− v(g + εh
ik
σ − εik)
)
with notation of (5).
Since ij is null, the first term in the above equation vanishes. For the second term,
we have
1
2|g∆g′|!
∑
σ on g∆g′
(
v(g + εhikσ )− v(g + εh
ik
σ − εik)
)
=
|g∆g′|
2|g∆g′|!
∑
σ′ on g∆(g′−ij)
(
v(g + εhikσ′)− v(g + εh
ik
σ′ − εik)
)
(note that hikσ′ is a set in the sequence {λσ′(1)}, {λσ′(1), λσ′(2)}, . . . , g
′∆(g−ij)). In summary
we get
φg→g
′
i (v) =
1
2|g∆(g′ − ij)|!
∑
σ on g∆(g′−ij)
∑
ik∈g∆(g′−ij)
(
v(g+εhikσ )−v(g+εh
ik
σ −εik)
)
= φg→g
′−ij
i .
2. We suppose now that no null link exists in g∆g′ and that |g′ \ g| ≥ 2, with all links
in g′\g being symmetric. By symmetry we can set ν0(h) = v(g−h), ν1(h) = v(g−h+ ij),
ν2(h) = v(g − h + ij + kl), . . . , ν|g′\g|(h) = v(g
′ − h), with ij, kl, . . . ∈ g′ \ g, and h a set
of links in g \ g′. Then for any i such that i ⇀ g′ \ g and i 6⇀ g \ g′, we get
φg→g
′
i (v) =
1
2|g∆g′|!
∑
σ
∑
ik∈g′\g
(
v(g + εhikσ )− v(g + εh
ik
σ − ik)
)
(6)
=
1
2|g∆g′|!
∑
ik∈g′\g
( ∑
h−⊆g\g′
∑
h+⊆g′\g−ik
∑
σ
h−,h+
(
v(g − h− + h+ + ik)− v(g − h− + h+)
))
=
1
2|g∆g′|!
∑
ik∈g′\g
( ∑
h−⊆g\g′
∑
h+⊆g′\g−ik
∑
σ
h−,h+
(
ν|h+|+1(h
−)− ν|h+|(h
−)
))
,
where σh−,h+ is any permutation putting first links in h
− ∪h+ in any order. Observe that
K =
∑
h−⊆g\g′
∑
h+⊆g′\g−ik
∑
σ
h−,h+
(
ν|h+|+1(h
−)− ν|h+|(h
−)
)
is constant for every ik ∈ g′ \ g. Therefore
φg→g
′
i (v) =
dg′\g(i)
2|g∆g′|!
K,
17
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the desired result.
(ED): similar to (S). In the case of (ED), we have h+ = ∅ in the above equations, and
letting (g′ \ g)∗ = {ij}, the degrees of i and j are equal to 1.
(ASEL): Consider that links in (g \ g′)∗ and in (g′ \ g)∗ are symmetric for v, and that
any two links λ ∈ (g \ g′)∗, λ′ ∈ (g′ \ g)∗ are antisymmetric for v. Take i, j ∈ N such that
(g \ g′)∗ 6↼ i ⇀ (g′ \ g)∗, and (g′ \ g)∗ 6↼ j ⇀ (g \ g′)∗. We have by (5):
φg→g
′
i (v) =
1
2|(g∆g′)∗|
∑
ik∈(g′\g)∗
|(g∆g′)∗|∑
m=0
∑
h−⊆(g\g′)∗
h+⊆(g′\g)∗−ik
|h+∪h−|=m
m!(|(g∆g′)∗| −m− 1)!
(
v(g + h+ − h− + ik)
− v(g + h+ − h−)
)
φg→g
′
j (v) =
1
2|(g∆g′)∗|
∑
jℓ∈(g\g′)∗
|(g∆g′)∗|∑
m=0
∑
h−⊆(g\g′)∗−jℓ
h+⊆(g′\g)∗
|h+∪h−|=m
m!(|(g∆g′)∗| −m− 1)!
(
v(g + h+ − h− − jℓ)
− v(g + h+ − h−)
)
,
which we rewrite simply as
φg→g
′
i (v) =
1
2|(g∆g′)∗|
∑
ik∈(g′\g)∗
φg→g
′
i,ik (v)
φg→g
′
j (v) =
1
2|(g∆g′)∗|
∑
jℓ∈(g\g′)∗
φg→g
′
j,jℓ (v).
18
 
Documents de Travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2013.63
Let us prove that φg→g
′
i,ik (v) = φ
g→g′
j,jℓ (v) using the fact that ik and jℓ are antisymmetric
for v, that is, v(g′′ + ik) = v(g′′ − jℓ) for every graph jℓ ∈ g′′ 6∋ ik:
φg→g
′
j,jℓ (v) =
|(g∆g′)∗|∑
m=0
m!(|(g∆g′)∗| −m− 1)!
( ∑
h−⊆(g\g′)∗−jℓ
h+⊆(g′\g)∗
h+ 6∋ik
|h+∪h−|=m
(
v(g + h+ − h− − jℓ)− v(g + h+ − h−)
)
+
∑
h−⊆(g\g′)∗−jℓ
h+⊆(g′\g)∗
h+∋ik
|h+∪h−|=m
(
v(g + h+ − h− − jℓ)− v(g + h+ − h−)
))
=
|(g∆g′)∗|∑
m=0
m!(|(g∆g′)∗| −m− 1)!
( ∑
h−⊆(g\g′)∗−jℓ
h+⊆(g′\g)∗
h+ 6∋ik
|h+∪h−|=m
(
v(g + h+ + ik − h−)− v(g + h+ − h−)
)
+
∑
h−⊆(g\g′)∗−jℓ
h+⊆(g′\g)∗
h+∋ik
|h+∪h−|=m
(
v(g + h+ − h− − jℓ)− v(g + h+ − ik − h− − jℓ)
))
.
After a slight rewriting of φg→g
′
i,ik (v):
φg→g
′
i,ik (v) =
|(g∆g′)∗|∑
m=0
m!(|(g∆g′)∗| −m− 1)!
( ∑
h−⊆(g\g′)∗
h+⊆(g′\g)∗−ik
h− 6∋jℓ
|h+∪h−|=m
(
v(g + h+ − h− + ik)− v(g + h+ − h−)
)
+
∑
h−⊆(g\g′)∗
h+⊆(g′\g)∗−ik
h−∋jℓ
|h+∪h−|=m
(
v(g + h+ − h− + ik)− v(g + h+ − h−)
))
=
|(g∆g′)∗|∑
m=0
m!(|(g∆g′)∗| −m− 1)!
( ∑
h−⊆(g\g′)∗
h+⊆(g′\g)∗−ik
h− 6∋jℓ
|h+∪h−|=m
(
v(g + h+ + ik − h−)− v(g + h+ − h−)
)
+
∑
h−⊆(g\g′)∗−jℓ
h+⊆(g′\g)∗
h+∋ik
|h+∪h−|=m
(
v(g + h+ − h− − jℓ)− v(g + h+ − ik − h− − jℓ)
))
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we see that φg→g
′
i,ik (v) = φ
g→g′
j,jℓ (v), as desired. Now, by symmetry, φ
g→g′
i,ik (v) = φ
g→g′
i,ik′ (v) for
every two links ik, ik′ ∈ (g′ \ g)∗, and similarly for φg→g
′
j,jℓ (v), which proves the result.
We address now the case where a node i is adjacent to links both in (g′ \ g)∗ and
(g \ g′)∗. In this case, we have:
φg→g
′
i (v) =
1
2|(g∆g′)∗|
( ∑
ik∈(g′\g)∗
|(g∆g′)∗|∑
m=0
∑
h−⊆(g\g′)∗
h+⊆(g′\g)∗−ik
|h+∪h−|=m
m!(|(g∆g′)∗| −m− 1)!
(
v(g + h+ − h− + ik)
− v(g + h+ − h−)
)
+
∑
iℓ∈(g\g′)∗
|(g∆g′)∗|∑
m=0
∑
h−⊆(g\g′)∗−iℓ
h+⊆(g′\g)∗
|h+∪h−|=m
m!(|(g∆g′)∗| −m− 1)!
(
v(g + h+ − h− − iℓ)
− v(g + h+ − h−)
))
=
1
2|(g∆g′)∗|
( ∑
ik∈(g′\g)∗
φg→g
′
i,ik (v) +
∑
iℓ∈(g\g′)∗
φg→g
′
i,iℓ (v)
)
.
Proceeding exactly as above shows that φg→g
′
i,ik (v) = φ
g→g′
i,iℓ (v). Now, by symmetry of all
links in (g′ \ g)∗, φg→g
′
i,ik (v) = φ
g→g′
i,ik′ (v) for any ik, ik
′ ∈ (g′ \ g)∗, and similarly for links in
(g \ g′)∗, which proves the result. 
Proof of Theorem 1
We know by Proposition 2 that the LBD rule satisfies all these axioms. It remains to
show uniqueness. By (L) and (C), it suffices to prove that for any unanimity game uh,
any transition g → g′, ψg→g
′
(uh) is uniquely determined.
We consider the unanimity game uh, h ⊆ g
N . Inactive players are those not adjacent
to g∆g′ and receive 0 by (IP). Now, by Lemma 3, links not in h are null. Therefore, if
an active player is not adjacent to a link both in h and in g∆g′, by (NL) he receives 0.
Then by (E), (NL) and (IP) we have in any situation:
uh(g
′)− uh(g) =
∑
i⇀h∩(g∆g′)
ψg→g
′
i (uh), (7)
and ψg→g
′
i (uh) = 0 if i 6⇀ h ∩ (g∆g
′).
1. We suppose g ⊆ g′. From (7), we have:
(i) If h ∩ (g′ \ g) = ∅, ψg→g
′
i (uh) = 0 for all i;
(ii) If h ∩ (g′ \ g) = {ij} (only one nonnull link), by (ED) it follows that
ψg→g
′
i (uh) = ψ
g→g′
j (uh) =
uh(g
′)− uh(g)
2
,
and the other players adjacent to g′ \ g receive 0;
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(iii) If |h∩ (g′ \ g)| > 1, by Lemma 3, all links in h∩ (g′ \ g) are symmetric. Hence by (S),
we find for any player i adjacent to (g′ \ g)∗ = h ∩ (g′ \ g):
ψg→g
′
i (uh) =
dh∩(g′\g)(i)(uh(g
′)− uh(g))∑
j⇀h∩(g′\g) dh∩(g′\g)(j)
, (8)
and the others receive 0.
Finally,
uh(g
′)− uh(g) =
{
1, if h ⊆ g′ and h 6⊆ g
0, otherwise.
(9)
Combining the above results and (9), ψg→g
′
(uh) is uniquely determined.
2. The case g′ ⊆ g proceeds similarly.
3. We suppose g \ g′ 6= ∅ and g′ \ g 6= ∅. Observe that
uh(g
′)− uh(g) =


1, if h ⊆ g′ and h 6⊆ g ∩ g′
−1, if h ⊆ g and h 6⊆ g ∩ g′
0, otherwise.
(10)
3.1. Suppose h ⊆ g′ and h 6⊆ g∩g′, hence h∩ (g∆g′) 6= ∅ and h∩ (g∆g′) = h∩ (g′ \ g).
Using (7), we can proceed as in case 1:
(i) If h ∩ (g′ \ g) = {ij}, by (ED) it follows that
ψg→g
′
i (uh) = ψ
g→g′
j (uh) =
1
2
.
(ii) If |h ∩ (g′ \ g)| > 1, we find for any player i adjacent to (g′ \ g)∗ = h ∩ (g∆g′):
ψg→g
′
i (uh) =
dh∩(g∆g′)(i)∑
j⇀h∩(g∆g′) dh∩(g∆g′)(j)
, (11)
and the others receive 0.
3.2. The case h ⊆ g and h 6⊆ g ∩ g′ proceeds similarly and yields
ψg→g
′
i (uh) = −
dh∩(g∆g′)(i)∑
j⇀h∩(g∆g′) dh∩(g∆g′)(j)
. (12)
3.3 Suppose h ⊆ g ∩ g′. Then all links in g∆g′ are null, hence
ψg→g
′
i (uh) = 0, ∀i ∈ N. (13)
3.4 Suppose h 6⊆ g and h 6⊆ g′. Equation (7) becomes:∑
i⇀h∩(g∆g′)
ψg→g
′
i (uh) =
∑
i⇀h∩(g′\g)
& i6⇀h∩(g\g′)
ψg→g
′
i (uh)+
∑
i⇀h∩(g\g′)
& i6⇀h∩(g′\g)
ψg→g
′
i (uh)+
∑
i⇀h∩(g′\g)
& i⇀h∩(g\g′)
ψg→g
′
i (uh) = 0.
(14)
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3.4.1. Suppose h ∩ (g′ \ g) = ∅. Then (14) reduces to∑
i⇀h∩(g\g′)
ψg→g
′
i (uh) = 0.
By Lemma 3(ii), all links in h ∩ (g \ g′) are symmetric if there are at least two. Then
(ED) or (S) imply ψg→g
′
i (uh) = 0 for all i ⇀ h ∩ (g∆g
′), and by (IP)
ψg→g
′
i (uh) = 0, ∀i ∈ N. (15)
3.4.2. The case h ∩ (g \ g′) = ∅ proceeds similarly, and we also find (15).
3.4.3 Suppose h ∩ (g′ \ g) 6= ∅ and h ∩ (g \ g′) 6= ∅. We proceed by induction on
|h ∩ (g′ \ g)|.
We consider first that h ∩ (g′ \ g) = {ij} and the game v = uh − uh−ij. Applying
Lemma 1, it is easy to check that ij and kℓ are antisymmetric for v, for any kℓ ∈ h∩(g\g′).
Also, all links in h ∩ (g \ g′) are symmetric for v when there are at least two links. Then
it follows from (ASEL) that
ψg→g
′
i (v)
dh∩(g∆g′)(i)
=
ψg→g
′
j (v)
dh∩(g∆g′)(j)
=
ψg→g
′
k (v)
dh∩(g∆g′)(k)
=
ψg→g
′
ℓ (v)
dh∩(g∆g′)(ℓ)
which by linearity (L) turns into
ψg→g
′
i (uh)− ψ
g→g′
i (uh−ij)
dh∩(g∆g′)(i)
=
ψg→g
′
j (uh)− ψ
g→g′
j (uh−ij)
dh∩(g∆g′)(j)
=
ψg→g
′
k (uh)− ψ
g→g′
k (uh−ij)
dh∩(g∆g′)(k)
=
ψg→g
′
ℓ (uh)− ψ
g→g′
ℓ (uh−ij)
dh∩(g∆g′)(ℓ)
.
Since (h − ij) ∩ (g′ \ g) = ∅, we are back to case 3.4.1., hence ψg→g
′
(uh−ij) = 0 and we
obtain
ψg→g
′
i (uh)
dh∩(g∆g′)(i)
=
ψg→g
′
j (uh)
dh∩(g∆g′)(j)
=
ψg→g
′
k (uh)
dh∩(g∆g′)(k)
=
ψg→g
′
ℓ (uh)
dh∩(g∆g′)(ℓ)
. (16)
Now, consider again equation (14). Observe that ψg→g
′
i (uh), ψ
g→g′
j (uh), ψ
g→g′
k (uh) and
ψg→g
′
ℓ (uh) are variables in this equation. Moreover, we can apply (S) or (ED) to the
nodes i′ in the second term (those adjacent to h ∩ (g \ g′) but not to h ∩ (g′ \ g)), while
the first and third term can only concern i or j or both. It follows that (14) contains
only the variables ψg→g
′
i (uh), ψ
g→g′
j (uh), ψ
g→g′
k (uh) and ψ
g→g′
ℓ (uh). Substituting into it the
different equalities in (16) determine these variables uniquely.
Suppose now that ψg→g
′
i (uh) is known till |h ∩ (g
′ \ g)| = m < |g′ \ g| and let us
determine ψg→g
′
(uh) when |h ∩ (g
′ \ g)| = m+ 1. Consider the game
v =
∑
h′⊆h∩(g′\g)
(−1)|h
′|uh−h′.
We claim that any ij ∈ h∩ (g′ \ g) and any kℓ ∈ h∩ (g \ g′) are antisymmetric for v, and
that moreover all ij ∈ h∩ (g′ \ g) are symmetric for v, and so are all links in h∩ (g \ g′).
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Proof of the Claim: The values of the Mo¨bius transform of v are 1 for h, −1 for
h−ij, 1 for h−ij−i′j′, −1 for h−ij−i′j′−i′′j′′, etc., with ij, i′j′, i′′j′′ ∈ h∩(g′\g),
and 0 otherwise. Let us check antisymmetry for ij ∈ h∩(g′\g) and kℓ ∈ h∩(g\g′)
by Lemma 1. We must check that
mv(g + ij + kℓ) = −mv(g + ij)−mv(g + kℓ), ∀g 6∋ ij, kℓ.
Observe that mv(g + ij) = 0 for every g 6∋ ij, kℓ. By construction either mv(g +
ij + kl) and mv(g + kℓ) are both 0 (if g 6= h − h′ − kℓ for some h′ ⊆ h ∩ (g′ \ g)
containing ij), or mv(g+ ij+kℓ) = −mv(g+kℓ) holds. In both cases, the equality
holds. Now, by Lemma 2, symmetry holds for any two links in h ∩ (g′ \ g) if mv
is symmetric for these links, which is the case by construction. Finally, any two
links in h∩ (g \ g′) are symmetric for v because they are symmetric for each uh−h′,
h′ ⊆ h ∩ (g \ g′).
Hence (ASEL) can be applied to any pair of links ij ∈ h ∩ (g′ \ g) and kℓ ∈ h ∩ (g \ g′),
and since by induction hypothesis, all ψg→g
′
(uh−h′), h
′ 6= ∅ are determined, it follows that
(16) holds, for any ij ∈ h ∩ (g′ \ g) and any kℓ ∈ h ∩ (g \ g′). Finally, the successive
substitutions into (14) determine ψg→g
′
(uh) uniquely. 
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